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The principle of universality is a cornerstone of the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child. Study of displaced Iraqi children in Jordan reveals the political and 
economic factors that can militate against universality in practice. Following an 
account of Iraqi displacement in Jordan and of Iraqi children’s situation from a 
rights perspective we consider the institutional response offered by host 
government, Western donors, and UN agencies and INGOs. As we argue, together 
these different actors have created, albeit unintentionally, what may be considered 
a ‘network of disregard’ in which a relationship of mutual dependence inhibits the 
pursuit of a principled, non-discriminatory approach to the realisation of rights.  In 
consequence Iraqi refugee children are left in a state of enduring limbo: at best 
receiving support in a piecemeal manner. This unfortunate situation raises 
important issues about the child rights project as it has been conceived and 
operationalised.  
 
Keywords: Refugees, Children, Rights, Iraq, Jordan, Development 
--------------------- 
 
In 2014 child rights activists marked the 25th anniversary of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). The principle of universality is foundational to this 
instrument of international law and thus incumbent upon States Parties.  Realisation 
of this principle requires governments to treat in an equitable manner all children 
residing on their sovereign territory, regardless of citizenship status. This includes 
children seeking asylum (Article 22). Evidence from Western nations suggests that, in 
practice, refugee and asylum-seeking children are often subject to treatment that fails 
to meet their protection needs and support that falls below that afforded to nationals 
(e.g. Bhabha & Crock, 2007). What then might be the experience in countries less 
blessed with resources? This question is important to explore not only for the sake of 
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specific groups of displaced children but also for what it may reveal about the 
conceptual and operational limitations of the current approach to children’s rights.  
We set out here to explore this question by drawing upon a study of the institutional 
response to a specific population group – Iraqi children in Jordan.  
 
Our enquiry took place from January to March 2014. It involved interviews with 47 
people from 27 different agencies plus seven independent observers, all based in 
Amman. The selection of aid agencies and government departments for interview was 
based upon their current or previous work with displaced Iraqis. Bilateral Western 
donors were approached due to their particular fields of interest, regardless of prior 
support for Iraqis. Engagement with UN agencies and INGOs was fairly exhaustive 
(all but two INGOs known by us to be working with Iraqis were interviewed). 
However, our efforts to interview donors were less successful, reflecting it seemed, 
the lack of interest in Iraqi refugees amongst the large majority. We reflect upon this 
point below.   
 
We also engaged displaced Iraqis across a range of settings – within a community 
centre, in classrooms and through visits to families in their homes. Initial contact was 
made through two community centres in East Amman where we contributed to 
activities on a voluntary basis. Aside from one focus group discussion with adult 
males, research entailed informal discussion typically within the homes of Iraqis. The 
focus of such enquiry was upon experience of the institutional response rather than 
upon life as a refugee more generally.  
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We chose not to undertake research directly with under 18 year olds. Building trust 
with children (and their caregivers) in this fragile situation in order to discuss 
sensitive issues was not a task that we felt could be achieved within the time 
available. This leaves a significant gap in our work that we hope ourselves or others 
will address in the near future.    
 
Our enquiry into the institutional response to Iraqi children seeking refuge in Jordan 
illustrates how the principle of universality of children’s rights may be compromised 
in practice.  In this setting the realisation of children’s basic rights is contingent upon 
fluctuating circumstance, most notably: the availability of funding, the disposition of 
agencies and individual staff members, and the attitude of host state authorities.  
 
Our discussion is structured as follows. We begin with an overview of the history and 
character of the Iraqi presence in Jordan since 2003. This leads to description of the 
situation of children. The reasons for the contingent realisation of their rights is then 
considered in relation to various institutional actors whose actions and inactions have 
greatest consequence: the Government of Jordan, UN and international humanitarian / 
development agencies, and western donors. We conclude with observations of 
relevance for the broad project of children’s rights raised by our study. 
 
Displaced Iraqis in Jordan 
More than a decade after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the displacement of 
civilians continues. Over the intervening period hundreds of thousands have fled their 
homes. Sectarian conflict has been the most common source of violence and, although 
this has fluctuated in intensity during the past ten years, it has never entirely 
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disappeared. More recently the actions of Islamic State in Iraq have contributed to 
increased displacement.1 Consequently, Jordan has also been host to a large number 
of aid organisations – from the various UN agencies and large INGOs to smaller 
foreign organisations that operate in only a few locations. In addition, many local 
NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) have delivered services to 
displaced Iraqis. 
 
Unlike the Palestinians who fled to Jordan in 1948 and 1967, and the Syrians who 
have been arriving in large numbers since 2012, the Iraqis have not been housed in 
displacement camps. They have, instead, sought accommodation primarily in cities, 
most especially Amman. The wealthy have settled in smart neighbourhoods of ‘West 
Amman’ while those without such resources have entered the private rental market in 
low-cost neighbourhoods of ‘East Amman’ and in other cities, notably Zarqa and 
Irbid.  
 
Geographical location is not the only significant difference between the Iraqis in West 
Amman and others. Those with adequate funds, 25,000 Jordanian Dinar at the time of 
our research (IRIN, 2013), are able to obtain residency permits that enable them to 
enter the formal labour market. Employment is also allowed and associated residency 
granted for individuals who have the requisite skills for jobs that Jordanian citizens 
are not able to fill.2 This would typically include higher education lecturers and 
medical specialists. In addition, university students are able to obtain residency 
permits for the duration of their studies, but the enrolment fees are high. In the 
absence of sufficient capital, the specialised skills to gain a high status job, or 
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participation in higher education, the majority of Iraqis are denied both legal 
residency and access to formal employment.  
 
The Government of Jordan has not signed or ratified the 1951 UN Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and thus does not offer formal asylum. According 
to Dallal Stevens, “Jordan’s refugee law remains virtually non-existent” (2013:6). 
Iraqis have typically entered the country on tourist or medical visas and registered 
with UNHCR in order to receive a document asserting their status as asylum seekers. 
Most renew their original entry visas for the maximum time possible, after which they 
become liable for an overstay fine: 1.5JD per person per day at the time of research.  
 
The majority of displaced Iraqis without residency view Jordan as a staging post on 
the path to residence elsewhere, and UNHCR continues to consider resettlement the 
primary durable solution for this population.3 Several countries have admitted Iraqis 
through regular and/or special resettlement programmes, notably Australia, Canada, 
Sweden Germany and the US. At the perceived height of the Iraqi crisis - between 
2007-2011 – around 18,000 were resettled from Jordan through UNHCR4 as part of a 
region-wide resettlement effort.5 By 2014 only the US continued any significant 
resettlement of Iraqis, according to our interviewees.  
 
There are considerable challenges – practical and political – in obtaining accurate 
statistics about displaced Iraqis in Jordan. This includes the total number present in 
the country. In 2007 the Jordanian Government suggested the figure of 450,000 while 
a sample survey put the number at around 160,000 (Fafo, 2007). We have discussed 
the political considerations and sensitivities around such statistics elsewhere (Hart & 
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Kvittingen, 2015). Here we rely on the most reliable statistics available, cross-
checking these wherever possible.  
 
Around the time of our research UNHCR stated that approximately 30,000 Iraqis 
were registered with that organisation. Roughly 35% of these were under 18 years of 
age, yielding a total figure of 10,500.6 However, this number has likely grown with 
the increase in arrivals from late 2013. Furthermore, one must assume there are still 
thousands awaiting refugee determination by UNHCR given the time it takes to 
process applications.7 
 
Alongside Iraqis who have been refused resettlement in a third country are thousands 
of applicants still awaiting review. As reported by agency staff and by displaced 
individuals themselves, the process can take years.8 In this situation of limbo, savings 
expire and relatives struggle to sustain remittances. Those who registered up until 
2012 commonly receive a monthly stipend from UNHCR. However, financial support 
for families arriving more recently is generally limited to one-off payments. In 2013 
average household income for displaced Iraqis without access to the formal labour 
market was estimated at 119JD per month – a shortfall of 167JD from the total 
amount needed for basic expenses (CARE, 2013: 9). Families are thus obliged to 
reduce their outgoings through such measures as sharing rental accommodation with 
other families, reducing their food intake, and selling off personal possessions 
(Moradian, 2010; Chatelard et.al. 2009:14). Some have chosen to return to Iraq due to 
the legal and socio-economic pressures of life in Jordan.9  However, not all these 
returnees were able to deal with the “tough compromises” required to integrate into 
the “new socio-political order” and subsequently re-migrated (Iaria, 2011: 114). 
	  8	  
 
In a situation of dwindling resources for aid agencies and insufficient income it is also 
inevitable that some Iraqis seek employment in the informal economy, generally in 
unskilled, manual jobs. This exposes them to exploitation. Deportation to Iraq for 
those caught working is rare. However, an individual may be detained, fined and even 
subjected to long-term extortion by the Jordanian ‘guarantor’ required for an Iraqi to 
gain release from custody. In spite of such risks anecdotal evidence strongly indicates 
that an increasing number are seeking some form of employment. This includes 
children.  
 
The violence that displaced Iraqis have experienced has taken many forms:  not only 
shooting and bombing but also rape, kidnapping and beatings. Several Iraqis also 
recounted incidents of violence involving the US and allied forces. In addition to the 
mental health consequences of violence endured before or during flight, life in Jordan 
creates immense challenges to psychological and emotional wellbeing. We were told 
repeatedly by displaced Iraqis about the sense of growing despair as months and years 
pass while waiting for news about an application for resettlement. Moreover, the 
reasons that some families were resettled relatively quickly while others continue to 
wait for news about their case were not clear. The impact of this situation of limbo 
was described by one local mental health worker as follows: 
 
‘Some of them they feel like they have no chance of getting out of this 
situation… But a lot of them they still cannot accept that. They hope that this 
will end…From time to time we hear that they are sitting outside UNHCR and 
waiting for someone to tell them when they can be resettled. ….So all the 
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uncertainty, not sure about the future, and all the concerns that someone will 
knock on the door.’ 
 
Speaking specifically about the impact of life in limbo upon children another local 
expert in the field of mental health related the following experience: 
 
‘I was working with the children’s group….There was an exercise about what 
kind of animals you like. One of those children said “I like cats. And I wish that 
I can get a cat”. We asked “but you can get a cat, why not? Your mum is not 
allowing you to have a cat in the home?” She said “no, no, but I will travel to 
the US. I don’t want to bring a cat to the house and to like it and then I need to 
go, to leave again.”  So you can imagine this situation living in the limbo how 
much it affects a child who can’t live his life to have a cat in his home, because 
he feels he will leave again…. So he doesn’t want to be attached to friends or to 
animals or to a place.’ 
 
Particularly for Iraqis living in some of the poorer and more crowded urban 
neighbourhoods there is the fear of verbal and physical harassment. Fighting back was 
seen as dangerous given the common perception that the police will always intervene 
on the side of the ‘locals’. The intimidation and sexual harassment of women has been 
identified as a significant issue causing some to alter their accent and in other ways 
seek to pass themselves off as Jordanian (Nusair, 2013). Bullying has been reported as 
a common aspect of the daily lives of Iraqi children in schools and neighbourhoods 
(Nelems, 2008: 38). It is to their specific situation that we now turn.  
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Displaced Iraqi Children from a Rights Perspective 
 
‘The principal normative standards of child protection are equally applicable to 
migrant children and children implicated in the process of migration. 
Accordingly, international law provides that all such children be seen and 
protected as children first and foremost, rather than letting their migratory or 
other status, or that of their parents, dictate their access to protection and 
assistance.’                 OHCHR, 2010:1 
 
In the course of our fieldwork a broad focus on children’s rights, as articulated in the 
UNCRC, was narrowed down to consideration of specific themes. Family life, access 
to services, involvement in exploitative labour, and discrimination emerged strongly 
from interviews, observations and the literature. In these domains we can witness the 
divergence in practice from agreed norms regarding the universality of children’s 
rights.  
 
The UNCRC identifies State Party responsibility for provision of services to children 
in a number of areas. The most obvious of these are education (Article 28), and 
healthcare (Article 24). In addition, assistance should be offered to children with 
physical or mental disabilities (Article 23) and those in need of support for 
psychological recovery (Article 39). The withdrawal of most bilateral funding 
previously dedicated to displaced Iraqis has created significant challenges to the 
realisation of these rights. This includes the rights of children with chronic conditions 
or disabilities. Agencies and individuals committed to an equitable response to 
children struggled to assist Iraqi children in the same manner as they would assist 
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Syrian or Jordanian children for whom there were dedicated funds. Frontline 
organisations were seeking to avoid discrimination based on country of origin, largely 
through their own resourcefulness. For example, one NGO worker, responding to a 
question about the potential discriminatory impact of current funding trends upon the 
ability to provide non-food relief items, noted: 
 
‘We can request approval from [name of organisation] for exceptions. For 
example if an Iraqi child needs a particular medical item - I know the person at 
[name of organisation] so can arrange this with a phone call.’  
 
To illustrate further the contingency in realisation of children’s basis rights we shall 
focus on the examples of educational access and family life.  
 
Education  
Until 2007 only private schools were accessible to the majority of Iraqi children 
(Nelems, 2008). In August of that year King Abdullah II issued a decree opening the 
public school system to Iraqi children for “humanitarian reasons”. This decree 
coincided with the provision of funds from the European Union and the US 
Government. Iraqi children were thus admitted from the 2007-2008 school year 
onwards.  
 
At the time of our research free access to primary and secondary education was 
offered to Iraqi children within government schools. However, take-up was far from 
universal. A survey in 2013 indicated a non-enrolment rate of 37.5%, and a non-
attendance rate of 40% among those enrolled (CARE, 2013:10). Factors that account 
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for these figures are commonly reported to include: associated costs of schooling 
(materials, transportation, etc); fear of bullying, and a sense that residence in Jordan is 
temporary and thus there is little point in engaging with the education system. In 
addition, certain conditions imposed by the Jordanian authorities discourage 
attendance. These include the need for certification from Iraq; the stipulation that any 
child over the age of 13 out of school for three years or more cannot re-enter; and the 
non-admittance of young people over the age of 18 even if they have not completed 
secondary education (Women’s Refugee Commission, 2009: 5; Nelems, 2008: 37-
40).  
 
In addition to these constraints, Iraqi children might only be admitted to school 
without charge if they are already registered with UNHCR. However, the registration 
process can take time. Indeed, with the huge numbers of Syrians adding immensely to 
the workload of UNHCR staff, several interviewees reported that 4-6 months are 
needed for a newly-arrived Iraqi family to register and thereby obtain the 
documentation required by school administrators.   
 
In the academic year 2013-14 no foreign funding was available to support Iraqi 
children’s access to the Jordanian public school system. Instead, the Jordanian 
authorities bore the costs themselves. Our interviews with government officials 
revealed grave concern about the sustainability of such access should foreign funds 
not be forthcoming in the future10. This is one significant example of the contingent 
realisation of Iraqi children’s rights: their access to free schooling (UNCRC, Article 
28) dependent upon funding arrangements that are subject to change year-on-year. As 
one development agency staff member recalled: 
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‘One of the key things in the early days with the Iraqi response was access to 
education. At that time, I remember we were begging for access and we said 
“Wait a minute, let's go back to the legalities of it: Jordan signed the [UN] CRC, 
and education is not something that you choose to give or not. It's a basic 
right.”’ 
 
 
Family Life 
In signing and ratifying the UNCRC States Parties signal their agreement with the 
following assertion articulated in the Preamble:  
 
‘Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural 
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly 
children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it 
can fully assume its responsibilities within the community,’ 
 
For reasons already explained, the conditions for most Iraqis are not conducive to 
economic, social and psycho-emotional wellbeing. Denied access to the labour market 
and obliged, typically, to wait for years in the hope of resettlement (if not already 
refused that opportunity) the pressures upon families were remarked upon as immense 
by many of our interviewees. As savings dwindle and foreign donors cut funding the 
levels of stress experienced by parents was widely reported to have reached 
unsustainable levels. Several interviewees noted the negative impact of such stress 
upon the ability of parents to offer care and support to their children. 
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Parents don’t really notice the difference in what children are going through. 
I’m always surprised when asking “haven’t you noticed this or that over the last 
month?” and they say “no”. I think they are so concerned with survival, - with 
food, rent, and stress - that they have don’t have much time to think about the 
children.                                                                        Local community worker 
 
One man who had been waiting for resettlement with his wife and children for several 
years commented: 
 
What kind of fun do you think the children here have had?  No fun, nothing, 
because they’re at home and they’re listening to us - the parents - struggling, 
fighting each other due to the lack of money.  
 
Our interviewees also made a clear connection between the socio-economic 
conditions of Iraqis and heightened levels of domestic violence. According to 
UNHCR, domestic violence has become a primary reason that Iraqi refugees seek to 
access the protection services of that organisation. As one child protection specialist 
observed: 
 
More poverty and less certainty lead to family violence. Also, lack of purpose, 
stress, overcrowding and lack of privacy – including the privacy needed for 
sexual relations - contribute to the frustration that can lead to violence. 
 
We heard numerous anecdotal reports about Iraqi children engaging in work within 
the informal economy. It seemed that no organisation had undertaken a systematic 
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study looking at the scale and incidence of such employment. Nevertheless, several 
organisations that work close to the ground were certain that this was occurring, 
particularly amongst boys from age 13-14 upwards. As an NGO staff member told us: 
 
‘The door is more open for job opportunities for children than adults. Police and 
labour inspectors are more lenient on women and children. Mostly male 
children work because of cultural norms. The father can’t work because he will 
be detained.’ 
 
According to several interviewees Iraqi children’s engagement in the informal labour 
market was a relatively new phenomenon. Accounts of them selling small items in the 
street, or working in shops and gas stations were interpreted by our interviewees as 
indication of growing desperation in many families.  
 
Exploitative involvement in the workplace, undermining of parents’ ability to provide 
a safe and nurturing environment, and fluctuating access to basic services are all 
examples of the challenges faced by Iraqi children in Jordan: a situation in which the 
realisation of their rights is a matter of contingency rather than clear principle. Access 
to education is contingent upon the funding of donors and the benevolence of the 
Jordanian monarch; the provision of non-food relief items upon the personal 
intervention of development workers; and the ability of parents to provide care and to 
prevent their children from having to work upon their resourcefulness while managing 
immense psychological and economic pressure. In the following section we consider 
reasons for this situation. We pay attention to the immediate economic factors. 
However, we are also concerned to explore the political, social and institutional 
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reasons that Iraqi children have, in many ways, become invisible to the actors that 
bear responsibility for their protection and wellbeing. These actors consist of the 
Government of Jordan, (western) donors, and UN agencies and INGOs, each 
discussed in turn. Although several of our interviews suggested the Iraqi Government 
could and should assist their citizens displaced overseas, none could think of any aid 
that had come from this source. Therefore the Government of Iraq is marked by its 
absence.   
  
Accounting for Contingency 
The Government of Jordan 
Jordan ratified the UNCRC in 1991. However, the fundamental principle of 
universality contained therein poses particular challenges for the society and polity of 
this country. Created by the colonial powers in 1922, the leadership has struggled for 
most of Jordan’s history to ensure that the nation held together.  Divisions of tribe, 
interlaced with spatial distinctions, have had to be managed with great dexterity by 
successive monarchs (Alon, 2009; Shlaim, 2008). Distribution of socio-economic 
benefit and maintenance of numerical, economic and political balance between the 
‘East Bankers’, whose families were living in present-day Jordan prior to 1948, and 
the Palestinian ‘West Bankers’, who arrived in this year and afterwards, have been 
key concerns (Baylouni, 2008: 280). Moreover, these macro-level divisions are 
symptomatic of a society wherein it is through the collective – familial, tribal, 
confessional, or based on shared ‘origins’ – that people pursue many of their 
fundamental needs and aspirations. A vision of the citizen as an individual possessing 
rights and served by a non-discriminating state is not deeply embedded politically and 
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culturally. The very notion of children’s rights therefore runs counter to much of 
Jordanian society. As a long-time advocate of children’s rights in Jordan observed:  
 
‘If you want to fit in you have to belong to a group. Our challenge is to ensure 
that each human being is perceived as worthy.’  
 
The contingent realisation of the rights of displaced Iraqi children may be partly 
understood in light of this. These young people are part of a group that is collectively 
labeled as “visitors” and “guests” by the authorities. As such they may hope to enjoy 
the hospitality of their Jordanian hosts but cannot expect to be treated in the same 
manner as children associated with groups recognised as insiders.  
 
There is an important precedent for this treatment - consideration of which may aid 
understanding of the situation and prospects for Iraqi children. For more than forty 
years there has existed an official sub-group of Palestinians that are treated 
systematically in a less favourable manner than other long-term residents, including 
the majority of Palestinan refugees. These are the people who came from Gaza in 
connection with the 1967 War and their descendents. The situation of the ‘Gazans’ - 
estimated to number around 120,000 (Perez, 2011: 1031) - is highly ambiguous. They 
have been allowed to remain in Jordan with the status of “foreign residents”: provided 
with two-year passports (rather than the regular five year passports) that do not 
include an ID number conferring full citizenship. They are thus rendered stateless in a 
formal sense. The passport given to them is not honoured by many Middle East states 
and their movement for the sake of employment is thereby seriously hindered (El 
Abed, 2006: 17). All Gazans over the age of 6 are treated as uninsured Jordanians in 
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government hospitals, but they are unable to access the government insurance scheme 
for the poor which would grant free treatment. There are also blocks on employment 
and professional advancement. Furthermore, the ambiguous status of this population 
group is passed on to each successive generation.  
 
The partial exclusion of the Gazans is not due to some inherent difference from 
Jordanians or fellow Palestinian refugees. The reason given officially for the 
withholding of full citizenship and equal treatment is to preserve their right of return 
(Perez, 2011: 1034). Since such a right endures for Palestinian refugees granted 
Jordanian nationality this is a questionable argument (Ibid, 1047). On the other hand, 
incorporation of any sizeable additional population group may affect inter-group 
dynamics and provoke opposition amongst tribal leaders who dominate the upper 
echelons of government and army (Alyssa, 2007; Baylouni, 2008).  
 
Through rigid adherence to the characterisation of the Gazans as “foreign residents” 
the inequities of their treatment over more than four decades have been justified. As 
with young Iraqis, this characterisation trumps consideration of ‘Gazan’ children as 
subjects of rights under the UNCRC. In this way, concerns related to the Jordanian 
national order take precedence over the universality foundational to international law 
(Perez, 2011: 1048).  
 
While the actual treatment of Iraqi refugees differs in its detail from that of the 
Gazans, the considerations that underlie treatment of the former can be understood as 
a replication of those governing treatment of the latter. Moreover, the Government’s 
response to the Iraqis is also a consequence of its concerns about the Gazans. That is 
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to say, bringing the treatment of Iraqi children in line with that of Jordanian citizen 
children could add to the pressure to improve the situation of the Gazans (Seeley, 
2010). Moreover, were the Iraqis alone to be treated better, it could fuel resentment 
amongst the latter – a population group long viewed as a potential security threat.11 
Speaking of the Iraqis, one interviewee observed:   
 
‘…with refugees it’s a political issue with the Palestinian refugees, the rights 
they are lacking, what they cannot do… The entire political discourse is shaped 
by animosity towards Palestinian social mobility and questioning the entire 
trajectory of Palestinians acquiring citizenship in the country.’ 
 
Aside from resettlement the single measure most likely to improve the situation of the 
Iraqis in the short-term was access to employment. Allowing this population to work 
would have immense positive consequences for children: enabling parents to provide 
greater material support and alleviating much of the stress that has proven so 
damaging to intra-household dynamics. It would also enable at least some of the 
Iraqis to access private educational and health services, thus reducing the burden on 
the public sector. Yet, the Government has been adamant in its refusal to relax 
restrictions on employment.  
 
Concerns about the impact of recognising the rights of Iraqi children as children and 
as refugees, rather than as the offspring of “visitors” or “guests”, need to be 
understand in context. Jordan is amongst the nations worldwide currently hosting 
most displaced people in both absolute numbers and relative to the size of its citizenry 
(UNHCR 2014). The main groups of refugees have been (non-citizen) Palestinians, 
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Iraqis and, most recently, Syrians with smaller numbers of other nationalities, 
including Sudanese and Eritreans. The presence of so many refugees has provided an 
important source of income to Jordan through foreign aid and the investment of 
wealthy incoming elites.12 Nevertheless, the social, economic, environmental and 
political strains resulting from the long-term presence of large refugee populations 
cannot be overlooked.  Given the numbers any government would struggle to meet its 
obligations to realise the rights of refugee children in an equitable manner, not least 
the government of a middle-income country located in the midst of a highly volatile 
region with scarce natural resources. Thus the support of other governments in 
addressing this challenge is vital.   
 
Western Donors 
“Given Jordan's pro-West strategic orientation, commitment to peace with 
Israel, and cooperation on counterterrorism and security matters, the United 
States has a strong interest in helping Amman manage potentially destabilizing 
change.”         Satloff and Schenker 2013:1 
 
As the Middle East experiences growing unrest, violence and displacement Jordan’s 
importance to Western governments as a reliable ally, military base, and moderating 
influence in regional affairs has also been reinforced. Ensuring the stability of the 
Jordanian monarchy is therefore a primary consideration.  
 
A second major aim, closely related to the first but less openly acknowledged, is to 
ensure that Jordan keeps the region’s displaced peoples on its sovereign territory. In 
so doing it serves to stem the potential flow of asylum seekers to Europe and North 
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America, enabling the pursuit of a programme of resettlement for only the most 
vulnerable refugees (Hart, 2014).  
 
How might we understand the connection between, on one hand, the concerns of 
Western donors for Jordan’s stability and its continued accommodation of refugees 
and, on the other, the kind of institutional response to displaced Iraqis that renders the 
realisation of children’s rights as a matter of contingency? This is a complex question 
to which we can only offer some speculative suggestions in response. In any case, one 
should not assume an explicit cause and effect relationship. Rather, it is necessary to 
consider Western aims as aspects of a field of forces that contribute to particular 
outcomes for displaced Iraqis, especially the young. With these caveats in mind, we 
shall here trace out our understanding based upon the insights revealed by the 
literature and through interviews. 
 
The importance to Western governments of the stability of the monarchy and the 
continued accommodation of refugees may be discerned in the large funds that have 
been supplied to Jordan in recent years. For example, in the period 2011-2013 the 
country received on average $750 million per year in economic and military aid from 
the USA (Sharp, 2014: 23). This made it the second largest recipient of US aid per 
capita after Israel.  
 
Given the large sums of money provided by the United States, the EU and western 
governments, it might be expected that these donors exert pressure to alter policies 
that are evidently detrimental to displaced populations including the Iraqis. Yet they 
seem reluctant to flex their muscles. Several interviewees expressed frustration that 
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the donors had pushed very little for changes in government policy that could 
ameliorate the situation of displaced Iraqis. Even at the height of donor spending on 
the Iraqis in the period 2007-2010 it seems that little challenge was made to Jordanian 
government policy in respect of this population (Seeley, 2010).  Issues that might 
have been addressed include entrance to the labour market, the granting of formal 
refugee status, and greater access to tertiary education: all of which would have a 
significant positive impact upon Iraqi refugee children.  
 
Amongst the major Western donors only the US has continued to offer considerable 
funds.13  The United Kingdom, by contrast, was not offering any assistance to the 
Iraqis at the time of our fieldwork. Representatives in Amman indicated that the 
Syrians were the only recent refugee population upon which the UK Government’s 
aid efforts were focused. The following quote from a long-standing expatriate aid 
worker, speaking about the Western donors in general, has particular resonance for 
the UK:  
 
‘There’s not really any political will to examine the situation more at the 
moment because no-one wants to look back.’ 
 
In the case of the United Kingdom, looking back might entail consideration of its role 
in provoking mass displacement within and from Iraq through the 2003 invasion and 
subsequent toppling of the Ba’athist regime. In 2006 the late Senator Edward 
Kennedy articulated the responsibility of the US towards people displaced by the 
ensuing sectarian violence: 
 
“The refugees are witnesses to the cruelty that stains our age, and they cannot 
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be overlooked. America bears heavy responsibility for their plight. We have a 
clear obligation to stop ignoring it and help chart a sensible course to ease the 
refugee crisis.’14 
 
The actions / inactions of the UK Government over recent years demonstrate, 
however, that the fate of children affected by a nation’s military adventures 
overseas can be ignored without consequence. This is a shortcoming of the child 
rights project that we discuss below.  
 
According to interviewees, the de facto policy of ignoring the Iraqis that the UK and 
most other western donors pursue might change in response to either of two scenarios. 
The first consists of a considerable upsurge in the arrival of Iraqis – in other words, a 
new ‘crisis’, according to the conventional understanding of the term. In this scenario, 
it seems unlikely that the situation of the existing Iraqi population in Jordan will be 
addressed adequately since their needs go beyond emergency assistance and require a 
more long-term, developmental perspective.15 The other scenario entailed significant 
mobilisation of the displaced Iraqi population as a result of their frustration. Given the 
primary concern of Western governments to ensure the stability of Jordan it was 
conceivable that, were this to occur, they would engage more thoroughly with the 
government and take a stronger line on tackling the causes of frustration. In the 
meantime, however, the aid agenda remained focused on humanitarian assistance, 
principally to the Syrians, leaving the INGOs and UN agencies, together with local 
NGOs and CBOs, to do their best for Iraqi children and their families with the 
dwindling sums provided.  
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UN Agencies and INGOs 
‘There was never a stabilisation of Iraqis here. This was always seen as a relief 
issue.’        INGO worker, Amman 
 
Displaced Iraqis in Jordan have predominantly been considered by outside agencies 
through the prism of ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’. This has remained the case in spite of 
the passing years and the evolving needs of this population and irrespective of the fact 
that most of the agencies have the capacity and experience to undertake a more 
developmental approach. Support in the form of aid for new arrivals and psychosocial 
programmes for those dealing with traumatic experiences of conflict and flight do not 
address the complex situation of displaced Iraqis as this have evolved over several 
years, giving rise to the need for livelihood support, secondary health care, housing, 
tertiary level education and vocational training.  
 
Remaining within an emergency framework has significant implications for the ways 
that agencies operate on the ground. Responding to ‘crisis’ they previously offered 
significant assistance to the Iraqis. However, when the crisis was perceived to have 
become less intense the motivation for continuing the work and, in some cases, for 
remaining in Jordan ended. The increasingly difficult situation of many Iraqis still in 
Jordan after several years, unable to work and stripped of savings, has not registered 
on a radar calibrated to trigger response only to major emergencies.  
 
Those interviewees who were aware of and concerned about the situation of displaced 
Iraqis in Jordan expressed great frustration at the dwindling financial support 
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available. A few interviewees described efforts to bring the needs of Iraqis back into 
discussion amongst agencies and donors. Yet, they must contend with a vicious circle 
the main elements of which are (1) lack of current knowledge; (2) absence of funding; 
and (3) excessive workload particularly as a result of the Syrian crisis. Breaking 
through any of these entails addressing the others. So, for example, in order to obtain 
funding for the Iraqis it would be necessary to engage donors with detailed 
information about current needs. Operating in ‘crisis’ mode even organisations that 
are explicit in their commitment to progressive realisation of children’s rights have 
struggled to secure the resources needed to remain aware of and responsive to the 
situation of Iraqi children. As one senior officer in a child-rights oriented 
organisation, answering a question about the scale of Iraqi children’s involvement in 
the informal labour market, told us: 
 
‘Honestly speaking, I can’t give specifics. Our interaction with the Iraqis has 
really gone down since the funding was cut two years ago.’ 
 
Lacking up-to-date, detailed knowledge of the situation of Iraqi children, some of our 
interviewees referred to current formal arrangements as indicators of the state of 
realisation of Iraqi children’s rights. Thus, in light of the fact that Iraqi children were, 
at that point, able to access schooling as well as basic health services their rights were 
being more or less upheld. This response seemed indistinguishable from a 
conventional needs-based approach. It failed to acknowledge that children are 
subjects of civil, political, social and economic rights and that the realisation of such 
rights for all children on its sovereign territory is incumbent upon a State Party, and 
therefore not contingent upon circumstances.  
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Displaced children’s immediate needs may be met through a conventional emergency 
response. However, as the time spent in limbo becomes countable in years 
vulnerabilities are liable to multiply due to progressive impoverishment, growing 
stress and frustration, strained access to services and dim prospects for higher 
education and regular employment. In this situation, holding responsible parties to 
account in terms of their obligations to Iraqi children under the UNCRC might be 
deemed particularly necessary. Yet, there was evidently a lack of resources – human 
and material – and little political will to do so.  
 
Minimal attention to the longer-term prospects of Iraqi children contrasted sharply 
with the considerable focus on their Syrian peers. This was evident in various national 
and regional initiatives being planned or implemented at the time of our research. For 
example, ‘No Lost Generation’16 - a regional initiative supported by four major 
INGOs, the governments of Canada, the US and UK, and five UN agencies - calls 
upon the general public to become “champions” for Syrian children through 
supporting organisations that seek to avert the risk that the future of these children 
“could be lost forever” (Childrenofsyria.org, 2014: 12). No such campaign exists for 
Iraqi children, nor for Palestinians and others displaced within the same region, 
thousands of whom live in similarly dire circumstances and whose futures are at the 
same risk of being “lost forever”.  
 
 
‘A Network of Disregard’ 
As Hannah Arendt observed more than half a century ago, aspirations for the 
universal achievement of human rights are liable to be frustrated within a world 
organised according to nation states (1951: 370). The contingent realisation of the 
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rights of displaced Iraqi children that we have described may, in our view, be 
understood as a consequence of this tension between global principle and national 
self-interest. However, we would argue that our study indicates the need to go beyond 
a focus on the actions and inactions of the host government alone. Rather, it is vital to 
frame the absence of a principled approach to the rights of these young refugees in 
transnational context. This brings into view the role of foreign governments, multi-
lateral institutions and INGOs.  
 
The governments of Jordan and Iraq, and all the major western donors, with the 
exception of the US, are States Parties to the UNCRC. All, with the partial exception 
of the US, are connected in what we could describe as a ‘network of disregard’ that 
has drawn into its ambit organisations mandated to work for the progressive 
realisation of children’s rights. The dynamics of this ‘network of disregard’ can be 
seen in relation to Iraqi children’s access to free schooling. From 2003-7 this was 
denied, then, when foreign funding became available, allowed. After this funding 
ended in 2012 access was temporarily enabled through the benevolence of the 
Jordanian monarch. These arrangements clearly indicate that the right of Iraqi 
children to education has not been established as an inviolable principle. The 
Jordanian authorities can point to the financial burden of educating this group as a 
reason for their inability to uphold this right. Western governments have 
demonstrated their unwillingness to push the Jordanians on such an issue. Were 
Jordan not providing a warehouse for the region’s refugees, countries such as the UK 
could expect many more Iraqi children, unaccompanied or in family groups, heading 
for their shores, making demands on their services. At the same time, Western donors 
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are largely unwilling to provide further funds to support Jordan in hosting Iraqis and 
providing services in a sustained manner as befits a rights-based approach.  
 
UN agencies and INGOs mandated to work for children’s rights are also implicated in 
this ‘network of disregard’. Reliant upon the financial and political support of 
Western donors for their operations and advocacy, and lacking the resources even to 
gather data on the situation of Iraqi children, adherence to the principle of universality 
is hard to maintain. Long-standing staff members aware of the dire situation of many 
Iraqi families all expressed great unease with this state of affairs, yet they appeared 
powerless to avoid their organisations’ complicity in the failure to take meaningful 
action.  
 
Concluding thoughts 
In taking as our focus of study the institutional response to Iraqi refugee children in 
Jordan, we are not suggesting that their unfortunate situation is unique in kind or 
degree. Rather, it is illustrative of significant shortcomings in the child rights project 
as this has been pursued. These shortcomings are both conceptual and operational. 
Conceptually, our research draws attention to the need for further thinking about the 
specific challenges to the realisation of the rights of non-citizen children – of which 
displaced Iraqi children in Jordan are but one example. This work has begun with 
particular discussion of legal obligations (e.g. Bhabha, 2010). However, there is a 
need for attention to political-economy and international relations. This might 
consider, for example, the responsibility of states that pursue war overseas (such as 
the UK in Iraq) for the plight of children who consequently become refugees. In 
operational terms advocates must consider how to establish effective mechanisms for 
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continuing to attend to large groups of non-citizen children that are not of interest to 
powerful states. Without such mechanisms further populations of displaced children, 
including the Syrians, may become invisible as well.  
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